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T HE RAPID GROWTH OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS has obliged the United Nations to seek new avenues of cooperation 
with groups of member States already organized for joint military action, such 
as NA TO.I This fact, coupled with Congressional concern that American 
forces serve under responsible leadership and that strict standards are adhered 
to in determining whether U.S. forces should participate in any peace 
enforcement operation, suggests that U.S. participation in such operations will 
be significantly restructured in the future. 
This restructured participation in international peacekeeping will likely 
drive similar rethinking among our major allies and other regular contributors 
to these operations. From the U.S. perspective, participation in these 
operations must now comply with the tenets of Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD) 25.2 This directive, which requires clear accountability in deciding 
when to participate, when to assign forces, and under what conditions, will 
likely preclude U.S. participation in Somalia,style operations in which UN 
leadership proved inadequate.3 
The renewed U.S. interest in extending the NATO Charter to encompass 
threats beyond present NATO borders,4 as evidenced in the currentNATO,led 
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Bosnia peace operation, suggests regional organizations such as NATO may 
become the leadership element of choice for future UN,sponsored 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. 
U.S. Concerns with UN .. Led Peace Operations 
Recent U.S. experience with the United Nations suggests that there are a 
limited number of States with the experience required to lead peace 
enforcement operations effectively. This creates difficulties in two ways. While 
the UN must rely upon those states with experienced leadership and highly 
trained forces for its more difficult operations to succeed, it must also provide 
some opportunity for participation to each of its 188 member States. This 
suggests that the UN must be encouraged to increase its capability to conduct 
Chapter VI peacekeeping operationss where a cease,fire exists and 
enforcement issues are minimal, and that Chapter VII enforcement 
operations6 might be better left to regional organizations such as NATO under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
In the nearly seven years since our participation and leadership role in 
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in support of the government of 
Kuwait, the United States has contributed significant forces, at great financial 
cost, to three complex military initiatives conducted under the authority and 
direction of the UN, and one currently being undertaken under NATO 
leadership. The military commitments undertaken under UN leadership in 
Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia,7 as well as the current NATO,led operation in 
Bosnia,s responded to multilateral requests for assistance voted upon in 
Security Council Resolutions. In another, the humanitarian effort in Rwanda, 
our participation was significant, although combat troops were not directly 
engaged. In each instance of our participation under UN leadership, the 
resulting opposition by Congressional leaders has been forcefully expressed on 
the floor of the House and Senate. In the case of Somalia, the Byrd and 
Kempthorne Amendments forced the U.S. withdrawal from that theater by 31 
March 1994.9 
The carefully developed response of the Clinton administration to these 
legislative pressures is found in PDD 25. The U.S. has strongly encouraged the 
UN and its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to 
institutionalize a similar policy analysis in its review of those troubled areas 
where the use of military force may be the only available international option. 
We have recently witnessed greater discrimination in DPKO decision, making 
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with respect to proposed operations in Burundi, Liberia, and Angola, 
suggesting the UN's own recognition of the benefit of this rigorous analysis. 
What may be more significant for the UN is its apparent recognition of its 
own limitations in addressing peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter where "all necessary means" are required. In supporting the 
current NATO leadership role in Bosnia, the UN leadership appears to have 
faced up to its lack of credibility in the areas of logistics support, intelligence 
gathering, operational leadership, and necessary airlift. For U.S. leaders, it is 
apparent the PDD 25 analysis simply will not authorize continued U.S. support 
for a UN leadership role in these operations-especially if regional 
organizations such as NATO can successfully exercise an expanded charter. 
PDD 25 Principles Support Leadership by Regional Organizations 
Presidential Decision Directive 25, signed in May 1994, is based upon the 
same principles that underlie the Weinberger Doctrine1o of 1984. The 
Directive provides for careful analysis of those factors most relevant to 
determining whether, when, how, and to what degree the U.S. should 
participate militarily in international peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
operations. The PDD 25 policy also requires a thorough assessment and 
continuing reassessment of our role to ensure that the operation to which we 
have committed forces is effective, well led, and operating within appropriate 
rules of engagement. The integrated leadership structure within NATO allows 
for this required assessment process, while UN,led force structures, such as 
those cobbled together in recent years for peace enforcement, may not. 
The impetus for the PDD, like the Weinberger Doctrine before it, came from 
a tragic loss of U.S. lives while U.S. forces were serving at the behest of the 
international community. Just as the purpose of the 1984 doctrine was to 
prevent the reoccurrence of another Beirut bombing incident in which 241 
servicemen lost their lives to Shiite extremists, the immediate purpose of the 
PDD was to prevent another disaster such as we experienced in Mogadishu, 
Somalia, where eighteen Americans were killed by General Mohammed Farah 
Aidid's forces in October 1993.11 
The bombing in Beirut can be traced in part to an unwitting shift in the U.S. 
operational posture from that of a non,partisan U.S. force patrolling various 
areas of the city and providing security at the Beirut International Airport to 
that of a partisan force with U.S. naval forces executing fire missions on behalf 
of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The tragedy in Mogadishu was similar in that 
our operational awareness of the intentions of Aidid was lacking and the force 
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committed did not reflect the actual requirements. Both PDD 25 and the 
Weinberger principles are designed to preclude the same lack of situational 
awareness that arose in Beirut and Somalia. 
When Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger outlined specific requirements for 
U.S. military involvement, he was not concerned with peace operations per 
se.12 Nevertheless, those principles, stated below, remain cogent, rational 
beacons in any reasoned analysis of the conditions underlying a decision to 
commit forces in every military operation, to include peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement under a NATO aegis. 
• Any use of force must be predicated upon a matter deemed vital to our 
national interest. 
• The commitment must be undertaken with the clear intention of 
winning. 
• We must have clearly defined political and military objectives. 
• The forces committed must be sufficient to meet the objectives. 
• There must be reasonable assurance that we have the support of the 
American people. 
• The commitment of U.S. forces to combat must be a last resort. 
Similarly, the principles within PDD 25 are presented as factors to be 
considered in a decision to commit U.S. forces, and equally important, as 
criteria required for the successful deployment of those forces. Of necessity, the 
conditions and requirements for a Chapter VII peace enforcement action are 
greater than for a Chapter VI peacekeeping initiative. As a necessary first step, 
the PDD requires that before voting for and supporting a peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement operation in the UN Security Council, the U.S. must ask whether 
the situation represents a threat to international peace and security. Second, 
does the proposed operation, as outlined by the Secretary General or the 
leadership of a regional organization, have a defined scope with clear 
objectives? Third, is there an international community of interest for dealing 
with the problem on a multilateral basis? Fourth, if a Chapter VI peacekeeping 
operation is contemplated, is there a working cease,fire in place? Fifth, are 
there financial and human resources available? Finally, is there an identifiable 
end,point? 
These are the same factors the U.S. considered in supporting the current 
NATO,sponsored peace operation in Bosnia. The PDD similarly requires that 
these factors be considered in determining when to extend an existing 
operation, such as recently occurred when the Congress approved the 
Administration's decision to extend the Bosnia operation. In addition, when 
significant U.S. troop involvement is contemplated in peace enforcement 
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operations where all necessary means are authorized, u.s. decision makers 
must now ask whether we have: 
• The ability to commit sufficient forces to achieve our clearly defined 
political and military objectives; 
• A clear intention to decisively achieve these objectives; and 
• The commitment on the part of the UN or a regional organization to 
continually reassess and adjust the objectives, rules of engagement, and 
composition of the force to meet changing operational demands. 
In committing to participate in the current peace enforcement initiative in 
Bosnia, President William Clinton determined that the PDD 25 requirements 
could only be met through a NATO,led operation. While u.s. leaders 
recognized that a cohesive force led by NATO leaders offered a more effective 
means of "executing" the UN mission in Bosnia, there is recognition on the 
part of all NATO members that the UN must remain the primary international 
"authority" under whose aegis these operations are conducted. 
NATO's Role in International Peacekeeping Under the UN Charter 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter13 refers to regional organizations, such as 
NATO, in the context of appropriate regional action in the maintenance of 
international peace and security.14 It is in this area that a relationship exists 
between the two organizations, with ultimate authority centered in the United 
Nations. Excepting the area of international peace and security, however, the 
relationship between the UN and NATO is not hierarchical. 
When the NATO Charter was established in 1949 by the Treaty of 
Washington,15 it made no mention of any relationship to the Security Council 
as a "regional arrangement," nor did it contain any provision providing for 
action only upon the authorization of the Security Council, or for reporting 
activities "in contemplation." Instead, the Treaty of Washington expressed the 
obligation of NATO's member states to be that of "collective self,defense" 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter and, correspondingly, embodied only the 
obligation to report "measures taken" to the Security Council.16 This 
formulation was adopted by the United States and its NATO allies because 
subordination of NATO actions as a regional arrangement to Security Council 
review in advance during the Cold War would have subjected all actions to 
Soviet veto. By characterizing NATO's military actions as "collective 
self,defense" under Article 51, there would be no action of a "regional 
arrangement" under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and no prior Security 
Council review. 
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The concerns described above and similar concerns with regard to a possible 
Chinese veto have, at least for now, dissolved. With the internal disintegration 
of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 and the events in Tiananmen Square in the 
People's Republic of China, those two permanent members of the Security 
Council have become more willing to support UN,directed involvement in 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. 
During his campaign for President of Russia in 1991, moreover, Boris Yeltsin 
committed to voting for Security Council initiatives which would support 
democratic principles. His current entreaties for continued U.S. financial 
assistance should ensure that Russia will not act unreasonably in that forum. 
Similarly, the fallout from the 1989 events in Beijing's Tiananmen Square has 
caused the People's Republic of China to be extremely careful in their actions 
in the United Nations and elsewhere lest they risk their "most favored nation" 
treatment by the United States.17 
The issues for the United States today in determining whether to support a 
response by a regional organization under Chapter VIII or that of the UN as a 
whole are more pragmatic than political. Our recent experience in Somalia 
with UNOSOM II and Bosnia with UNPROFOR suggest that UN,led operations 
may not be capable of undertaking Chapter VII (all necessary means) 
missions.I8 These peace enforcement missions require careful planning, 
experienced leadership, and highly integrated command and control 
arrangements. This combination is required to execute sophisticated 
air,ground coordination and air, artillery deconfliction as well as to implement 
robust rules of engagement that will protect the force and the civilian 
population. Most importantly, this cohesion is absolutely essential if forces with 
different experience levels and capabilities are to be successfully integrated to 
create force multiplication rather than force division. UN,led peace 
enforcement operations, unless directed by one of a handful of states, will 
continue to have difficulty achieving this integration. It is this understanding 
that underlies the U.S. support for the current NATO,led peace enforcement 
operation in Bosnia. 
NATO As a Regional Organization: Chapter vm in Operation 
The adaptation of NATO to a role as a Regional Organization under 
Chapter VIII with a peace enforcement charter must be viewed as part of a 
broad, long,term U.S. and Allied strategy that supports the evolution of a 
peaceful and democratic Europe. This strategy benefits U.S. security and builds 
on the bipartisan premise that the security of Europe is a vital U.S. interest. 
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Certainly, American sacrifices in two world wars and the Cold War have 
proven our commitment to the region as a community of shared values, and 
those U.S. sacrifices have more than established our interest in recognizing and 
encouraging the rapid settlement of disputes in the area. 
The U.S. and its NATO Allies have pursued a number ofinitiatives since the 
end of the Cold War to advance this strategy. These include negotiation and 
implementation of the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 
(CFE) ,19 support for the unification of Germany, bilateral assistance to support 
reforms in former Soviet states, negotiation and ratification of the START II 
strategic arms control treaty, programs to dismantle nuclear stockpiles in 
Russia, the elimination of intermediate nuclear forces (INF), including a 90 
percent overall reduction in NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe, and most 
importantly, active U.S. diplomacy and the deployment of American troops as 
part of a NATO,led force to help stop the war and secure the peace in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
NATO plays an important role in this broader strategy for many of the same 
reasons that it played an essential role in maintaining peace and security in 
Europe during the past fifty years. NATO's success during this period went far 
beyond its accomplishments as an effective military mechanism for collective 
defense and deterrence. It also proved invaluable as a political institution in 
fostering continuing involvement of the United States and Canada in 
European security. 
Adaptation of NATO's interest in broader European security to activity 
under the UN Charter's Chapter VIII began in 1990, soon after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. In July 1990, under the active leadership of the Bush 
administration, NATO's London Summit Declaration set out new goals for the 
Alliance, called for changes in its strategy and military structure, and declared 
that the Alliance no longer considered Russia an adversary. These efforts were 
reaffirmed by the Alliance's declaration in Copenhagen in June 1991, which 
stated that NATO's objective was "to help create a Europe whole and free." At 
NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991, the Alliance adopted a new 
strategic concept, which reaffirmed the continuing importance of collective 
defense, while orienting NATO toward new security challenges, such as 
out,of,area missions, crisis management, and peacekeeping operations. 
Since then, NATO has taken further steps to advance adaptation to a 
Chapter VIII role. At its January 1994 Summit in Brussels, the Alliance made 
two important decisions related to its status as a Regional Organization. First, it 
launched the Partnership for Peace (PFP) to enable intensive political and 
military,to,military cooperation with Europe's new democracies as well as 
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States which had considered themselves neutrals during the Cold War. PFP has 
proven to be an important and effective program for these States and for the 
Alliance: twenty,seven have joined PFPj a PFP Coordination Office has been 
established in Mons, Belgiumj and thirty major PFP exercises have been held 
through June 1997, plus numerous exercises with Partners "in the spirit" of 
PFP. The program is proving its merit in Bosnia,Herzegovina, where thirteen 
PFP partner States are making substantial contributions to the NATO,led 
peace enforcement operation in the Balkans. 
The second major initiative related to adaptation to Chapter VIII by NATO 
in Brussels in 1994 was the decision to embrace the concept of Combined Joint 
Task Forces (CJTF). This concept will enable both NATO forces and military 
assets to be employed in a more flexible manner to deal with peace 
enforcement obligations.20 
The benefits of a NATO doctrine that emphasizes flexible response as a 
Regional Organization are both immediate and long,term, and they accrue not 
only to existing and prospective NATO allies but to States who are outside the 
Alliance. Europe is a more secure and stable region because of NATO's 
commitment to work within Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Even now, 
Central and East European States are reconstructing their foreign and defense 
policies to bring them in line with Alliance values and norms. 
While there are many reasons for pursuing the values represented by 
NATO-i.e., democratic government, free markets, and security 
cooperation-a close analysis of recent events in Europe reveals that the 
NATO commitment to flexible response on the continent as a Regional 
Organization is also exerting a positive influence on States toward more 
peaceful relations. As an example, several recent agreements to ensure stable 
borders, promote inter,state cooperation, and address mutual concerns on the 
treatment of ethnic minorities have been signed. These include the 
Polish,Lithuanian Treaty of 1994, the Hungarian,Slovakian Treaty of 1996, a 
series of agreements in 1996 between Poland and Ukraine, the 1996 treaty 
between Hungary and Rumania, and the 1996 agreement between the Czech 
Republic and Germany concerning Sudetenland. 
The NATO acceptance of Chapter VIII responsibilities has been most 
significant in Bosnia. NATO countries made a profound contribution to 
European security through their participation in the NATO,led 
Implementation Force (IFOR) and are still doing so under its successor 
Stabilization Force (SFOR), which is continuing to implement the military 
aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. It is clear from these Bosnian missions 
that NATO members are already restructuring their forces so they can 
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participate in the full spectrum of current and new Alliance demands, 
including both Article V missions and peace enforcement missions. 
One caution arises from our NATO experience in Bosnia, however. This 
relates to mission creep and the concern that military forces are being asked to 
perform tasks that are neither military in nature nor related to the agreed 
mission statement. During the first year of the IFOR mission, NATO 
commanders managed to restrict their responsibilities to separating the 
opposing factions, collecting heavy weapons, and supervising the exchange of 
territory. By early 1997, broader additional taskings were imposed which would 
have been better handled by international civilian agencies or Bosnian 
authorities. These included requests to help resettle refugees, set up elections, 
monitor local police, and sort out control oflocal broadcast stations. Pressure 
has likewise grown on the SFOR to assist in, if not spearhead, the arrest of 
dozens of war criminals.21 
The U.S. understands that non,Article V NATO missions will only succeed 
if military personnel are limited to military tasks for which they have been 
trained. It is critical that NATO leaders carefully define force size, force 
structure, and mission as the SFOR proceeds. Allowing assignment of routine 
police functions to a military force will jeopardize many of the other obligations 
that the SFOR has assumed in Bosnia. 
Observations and Conclusions 
NATO acceptance of non,Article V missions is both necessary and 
contemplated by its Charter. With the end of the Cold War, there is a unique 
opportunity to build an improved security structure to provide increased 
stability in the Euro,Atlantic area without creating divisions among NATO 
members. The NATO alignment, with its history of military integration and 
cooperation brought about by years of successful planning and training for 
mutual defense responsibilities, is in the ideal position to participate effectively 
in peace enforcement activities requiring the exercise of "all necessary means" 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
As noted earlier, peace enforcement operations, to be effective, require 
careful planning, experienced leadership, and highly integrated command and 
control arrangements. The current Bosnia operation reflects that NATO,led 
forces can meet these requirements as well as comply with the principles of 
force commitment embodied in PDD 25. The carefully developed response of 
leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance to the military requirements of the 
Dayton Peace Accords reflect the immense potential resident in NATO for 
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peace enforcement. The UN has recognized the need for regional leadership, 
and NATO has proven that it can successfully execute missions under UN 
authority, following rational requirements for troop deployment. 
Notes 
1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, comprised of sixteen member States and three 
new invitees (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, who are to be accorded membership in 
1999), provides for collective defense in Article V of its Charter. Non-Article V missions 
authorized for consideration include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, now properly 
considered under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
2. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, May 4, 1994, "Reforming Multilateral Peace 
Operations," is a classified directive. An unclassified version has been published as Bureau of 
International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Pub. No. 10161, The Clinton 
Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (1994). 
3. See James P. Terry, U.N. Peacekeeping and Military Reality, 3 BROWN J. OF WORLD 
AFFAIRS 135, 136 (1996), for a review of UN inadequacies in peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement operations. 
4. During NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991, at the urging of the Bush 
administration, the Alliance adopted a new strategic concept which reaffirmed the continuing 
importance of collective defense, while orienting NATO toward new security challenges, such as 
out-of-area missions, crisis management, and peacekeeping operations. 
5. Chapter VI of the UN Charter includes Articles 32-38 and addresses "peaceful 
settlement of disputes." Although peacekeeping is nowhere mentioned in Chapter VI or 
elsewhere in the Charter, these articles (32-38) are interpreted to authorize the presence of an 
international interpositional force only after a peace agreement has been signed and the consent 
of the parties to the force presence and its mandate has been obtained. 
6. Chapter VII of the UN Charter includes Articles 39-51 and addresses "breaches of the 
peace." Because sovereignty claims under Article 2 of the Charter are subordinate to the 
international interest in redressing aggression, Chapter VII authorizes "enforcement" actions to 
restore the peace and maintain the international "status quo," without the requirement to obtain 
the approval of the disputing parties. 
7. Operations in Somalia included Operation REsTORE HOPE, authorized by the UN in 
S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRESn94 (1992), and 
UNOSOM II, authorized in S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3185th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/814 (1993). Operations in the former Yugoslavia included Operation DENY FLIGHT, 
authorized in S.c. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3919th mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRES/816 (1993), 
Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, authorized in S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th 
mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRESn70 (1992), and Operation SHARP GUARD, authorized in S.C. Res. 781, 
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122nd mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRESn81 (1992). Operations in Haiti 
included Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, authorized in S.C. Res. 940, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 
3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRES/940 (1994), and UNMIH, authorized in S.C. Res. 964, U.N. 
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3470th mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRES/964 (1994). 
8. The NATO-led Implementation Force (lFOR) implemented the military aspects of the 
1995 Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has now been succeeded by the 
NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). While President Clinton earlier set June 1998 as the 
end-date for U.s. participation, in December 1997 he agreed to extend that date. 
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9. The Byrd Amendment, Sect. 8156 of the FY 94 Defense Appropriations Act, provided 
that any funds appropriated for DoD may be obligated for expenses incurred only through March 
31, 1994, for "operations of United States Armed Forces in Somalia." Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act ofl994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8156, 107 Stat. 1418 (1993) (enacting the 
Byrd Amendment). The Kempthorne Amendment, Sect. 1002 to the FY 95 National Defense 
Authorization Act, although less onerous than the Byrd Amendment, restricted funding for U.S. 
military personnel on a "continuous" basis after September 30, 1994. National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 1002, 108 Stat. 2663 (1994) (enacting the 
Kempthorne Amendment). See James P. Terry, A Legal Review of us Military Involvement in 
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations, 42 NAVAL L. REv. 79 (1995), for a discussion of 
other legislation which would limit the President's Article II authority to engage in 
peacekeeping. These include the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment to the FY 95 Defense 
Authorization Act, the Peace Powers Act, and the National Security Revitalization Act. 
10. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. \Veinberger articulated criteria for U.S. intervention 
before the National Press Club on October 28, 1984. Secretary Weinberger's speech was printed 
verbatim in THE NEW' YORK TIMES, Oct. 29, 1984, at AI, A4. 
11. See discussion in James P. Terry, The Evolving US Policy for Peace Operations, 19 S. ILL. L. 
J.119 (1994). Our formal efforts to improve UN peacekeeping were begun, even before the 1993 
disaster, by former President George Bush. In a September 1992 speech to the UN, the 
then-President responded to the positive steps reflected in the Secretary General's 1992 
"Agenda for Peace" by committing the U.S. to work with the then-Undersecretary for 
Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, to improve UN peacekeeping capabilities. 
12. The \Veinberger Criteria evolved from "lessons learned" from the Long Commission 
Report, largely written by Professor Grunawalt while serving as Commission Counsel, which 
documented the flawed U.S. actions leading to the 1983 Beirut bombing. 
13. Chapter VIII, in Articles 52-54 of the UN Charter, specifically provides for "regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. Article 53 provides, in 
pertinent part: 
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or 
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. 
14. See An Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary General, Jan. 31, 1992, U.N. Doc. 
A/47/277-S/24111. In paragraphs 60-65, Boutros-Boutros Ghali called upon regional 
organizations to do more. In his 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, Report of the 
Secretary General, Jan. 3, 1995, U.N. Doc. N50/60-5/1995/1, the Secretary General specifically 
endorsed, in paragraph 79, the present NATO-led operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
15. Treaty of Washington (North Atlantic Treaty), 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. 1964 (entered 
into force August 24, 1949). 
16. Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington provides, in pertinent part: 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be 
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace 
and security. 
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17. See Terry, supra note 9, at 84. 
18. See discussion in BOWETI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITIITIONS 164-66 (4th 
ed.1982). 
19. This agreement alone has resulted in the elimination of more than 50,000 pieces of 
military equipment in Europe. 
20; A third major initiative involves the invitation of additional European States to join 
NATO. While this NATO Enlargement Initiative is not directly related to Chapter VIII 
involvement by NATO in peace enforcement activities, the training and increased 
military-to-military r~lations that will accompany enlargement will complement NATO's 
increased capacity to perform as a regional organization. 
21. In addition, several alleged Croat war criminals agreed to tum themselves in to SFOR 
officials in November 1997 in exchange for speedy trials. The U.S. has agreed to furnish 
investigators and military prosecutors to ensure compliance with the speedy trial guarantee. 
While not a part of the U.S. SFOR commitment directly, it reflects the type of military 
requirements we must be prepared to meet in peace enforcement operations. 
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